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The Significance of Looking Back:  
Fertility before the “Fertility Decline”1 
Josef Ehmer  
Abstract: »Die Bedeutung des Blicks zurück in die Geschichte: Fertilität vor 
dem “Geburtenrückgang”«. In this paper, I argue that living with no or few 
children and low fertility was widespread in pre-industrial societies. After a 
critical discussion of demographic transition theory and the concept of “natural 
fertility”, I investigate fertility in early modern Europe. In doing so, I follow 
the suggestion of “cultural demography” and combine quantitative and qualita-
tive research. I show a great extent and many variations of deliberate birth con-
trol before the “fertility decline” took place. This finding should help to see the 
actual level of fertility as less exceptional and dramatic than it is often claimed. 
Keywords: fertility, birth control, early modern period, Europe, Japan, demo-
graphic transition theory. 
1. Introduction: The Benefit of a Long 
Historical Perspective 
For quite a long time, the prevailing assumption was that there exists a clear 
dividing line between pre-modern reproductive behavior (with a high number 
of births) and modern limitation of fertility. Classic manifestations of this point 
of view are the theories of “demographic transition” and “natural fertility” 
discussed in greater detail below. Nevertheless, recent research has called into 
question such dichotomic conceptions. A study of history does not reveal two 
clear, discrete, homogeneous patterns; instead, human reproduction exhibits a 
high degree of variability and plasticity. These changing paradigms have given 
new significance to a long historical perspective on human reproduction. This 
paper argues that looking back in history makes it easier for us to understand 
the diversity of fertility, the complexity of its determinants, and to assess cur-
                                                             
1  As indicated in the Editorial, the papers in this special volume are the outgrowth of a con-
ference that was organized by a multidisciplinary working group on the subject of fertility. 
Accordingly, my chapter is not primarily intended for specialists in historical demography 
or population history, but rather social scientists, biologists, medical scientists and scholars 
in other disciplines who are doing research on fertility. At the same time, I also hope to 
contribute to the advancement of this discussion among historians. I would like to express 
my gratitude to Mel Greenwald for his help with the English version of this paper. 
  Address all communications to: Josef Ehmer, Institut für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschich-
te, Universität Wien, Dr.-Karl-Lueger-Ring 1, 1010 Vienna, Austria;  
e-mail: josef.ehmer@univie.ac.at. 
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rent demographic facts and circumstances. It also shields us from the assump-
tion that current circumstances are immutable over the long term, or that future 
changes in fertility can proceed in one possible direction only – that is, towards 
further limitation and reduction. From this perspective, the development of 
human reproduction has been diverse and variable, and its future is open. 
The benefit of a long historical perspective concerns, in principle, all his-
torical periods.2 Investigations of human fertility have not been limited to the 
Modern Age – neither on the individual level nor on the level of entire societies 
and countries. Anthropological as well as historical studies on the reproductive 
behavior of peoples of various stages of development have greatly enriched 
empirical evidence and theoretical reflection. In sum, they show an enormous 
degree of temporal variation as well as of regional, social and cultural differen-
tiation. Moreover, they indicate that in numerous historical societies and cul-
tures, individual women, men and couples have repeatedly sought to influence 
their reproduction, both to assure having offspring or to increase their numbers, 
or, conversely, to avoid procreation or to keep the number of their children low. 
Of course there are differences among historical epochs and the manifold cul-
tures of our world – with respect to the intentions that human beings pursue; 
the methods they utilize to promote or prevent pregnancies and births; the 
effectiveness of these methods; and finally with respect to the statistically 
quantifiable results of the reproductive behavior of large populations. However, 
both historical and global comparisons also make it possible to clearly bring 
out the relativity of the respective current circumstances. 
Of course, all historical forms of human reproduction are of interest to us; 
nevertheless, the so-called early modern period (roughly from the 16th to the 
18th century) assumes particular significance. Intensive historical-demographic 
research on precisely this period has established itself in Europe since the 
1950s (Flinn 1981, 1-12). It is based, firstly, on the quantitative evaluation of 
church registers that have recorded baptisms, marriages and deaths in individ-
ual parishes since the 16th and 17th centuries. These data allow scholars to 
reconstruct reproductive histories of individuals and single families, as well as 
making it possible to summarize the results and establish groups that differ 
from one another with respect to social, cultural or regional factors. Secondly, 
reproductive behavior in the early modern period has also been the subject of 
cultural historical research (McLaren 1984). The issues of sexuality and repro-
duction were, in this period, the focus of intensive discourses in religion, phi-
losophy and medicine as well as in jurisprudence, the arts and literature. Fur-
thermore, numerous so-called “ego-documents” such as letters, diaries and the 
like have come down to us; in them, individual men and woman expressed their 
views about sexuality, reproduction and contraception. Those who have their 
                                                             
2  For a recent population history of Europe which covers all historical periods see Bardet and 
Dupâquier (1997-1999). 
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say in such compositions are predominantly members of the upper classes. 
Statements on this subject by men and women of the lower classes, on the other 
hand, come to us primarily from court records having to do with illegitimate 
forms of sexuality. Sources of this kind make it possible to reconstruct attitudes 
about children, what motivated people to reproduce or avoid doing so, and the 
practices utilized to accomplish their respective aims. 
Such cultural-historical approaches were, of course, also developed for later 
historical phases. They play an increasingly important role for the analysis of 
the “First Fertility Decline” and the variations of fertility over the 20th century 
(Gillis, Tilly, and Levine 1992; Szreter 1996). In my opinion, though, what has 
occurred in the field of demographic analysis of the early modern period is a 
dialog between quantitative-statistical and cultural-historical approaches to a 
significantly greater extent than in scholarly research on other historical peri-
ods. New methodological approaches to explaining historical fertility trends 
and variations have been discussed in the field of international historical de-
mography ever since the 1980s. These approaches have been designated as 
“cultural demography” or “anthropological demography” (Kertzer and Fricke 
1997; Greenhalgh 1995). They aim to achieve greater integration of quantita-
tive demography, cultural history and historical anthropology. In research on 
the early modern period, this intention has been realized to a higher degree, in 
my view, than in research on earlier or later periods.  
These considerations have determined the configuration of the following 
paper. Firstly, I would like to discuss changing paradigms in the history of 
fertility over recent decades. Secondly, I will concentrate on the early modern 
period in order to show the results to which the combination of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches leads. 
2. Changing Paradigms in the Historical Study of Fertility 
2.1 The Theoretical Tradition: Transition Theory 
and Natural Fertility 
Until well into the 1980s, the idea of using a perspective extending back into 
pre-modern times for the explanation of modern and contemporary patterns of 
fertility was virtually inconceivable. Until then, the predominant view among 
demographers and historians of fertility was a dichotomic perspective that 
contrasted “pre-modern” and “modern” societies. This dichotomy is manifested 
particularly clearly in two influential theories. The first is the Theory of Demo-
graphic Transition that attempts to interlink the secular declines of fertility and 
mortality with each other as well as with the global population growth that 
began in the 18th century, and to describe and explain them as part of a like-
wise global social modernization process. It thus connects statements on past, 
present and future demographic developments. Transition means the transition 
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from an ancient demographic regime to a modern system of population and 
society (Marschalck 1987, 15). 
In recent decades, the theory has been intensively discussed, critiqued and 
modified. But in spite of all this criticism, it has retained its influence in demo-
graphic research as well as on global population policymaking, which is why it 
continues to be imperative to confront it. This paper argues that a critical dis-
tance to transition theory is needed to understand the significance of pre-
modern reproductive behavior. Therefore, the following section starts with a 
brief look at its origins and contents. 
The Theory of Demographic Transition is by no means a homogeneous, 
closed theoretical construction; rather, it is a corpus of ideas that has been 
developed since the 1920s by numerous French, British and American authors 
(Chesnai 1992, 1-9). It is “a set of generalizations about the decline in mortality 
and fertility that typically accompanies the modernization of a society” (Coale 
1986: xix). The term itself was coined in 1945 at the leading demographic 
research institution in the USA, Princeton University’s Office of Population 
Research, and this is also where the essential steps leading to its formulation as 
a general theory were taken (Notestein 1945, 41; Davis 1945). Its essential 
characteristics can be briefly described. According to the Theory of Demo-
graphic Transition, global population development proceeded in three phases. 
The first phase constituted a sort of “demographic state of nature” (Sokoll 
2000, 90) that lasted until the commencement of the transition. Arduous living 
conditions in this longest period of human history manifested themselves in a 
high mortality rate, which, in turn – in order for a human population to merely 
maintain its existing numbers – is said to call for an equally high fertility rate. 
“Any society having to face the heavy mortality characteristic of the premodern 
era must have high fertility to survive.” (Notestein 1945, 39). Accordingly, 
mortality and fertility were said to have achieved a state of near-equilibrium at 
a high level, which led to stagnation or very slow population growth. 
The so-called demographic transition is seen as the second phase. The over-
all process of modernization, but, most of all, innovations in agriculture, indus-
trialization and progress in the area of hygiene and medicine launched a long-
term decline in mortality. Fertility, on the other hand, reacted more slowly to 
the modernization process; being embedded in religious doctrines, moral pre-
cepts, customs, family forms, etc., all of which aimed to achieve high fertility. 
It remained high despite decreasing mortality, which led to rapid, steep popula-
tion growth. According to this analysis, a decline in birthrates set in gradually. 
Under the influence of urban and industrial ways of life and in connection with 
the rise of individualism, people liberated themselves from “older taboos” 
(ibid., 41) and developed new concepts of family size and number of offspring. 
This radical transition led to rational birth control through the use of contracep-
tive practices. 
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The result is said to have been adjustment of fertility to modern society’s 
lower mortality rates and, accordingly, the end of high rates of population 
growth. A “new demographic balance” (Davis 1945, 5) characterizes the third 
phase of population development in the Theory of Demographic Transition. In 
Europe, North America and the West’s other overseas outposts, this phase has 
already become a reality according to Notestein (1945, 40f.) in the middle of 
the 20th century. It is purported that this could also be achieved in the not-yet-
industrialized parts of the world if their inhabitants implement thoroughgoing 
modernization in accordance with the Western pattern – in particular, industri-
alization, urbanization, higher living standards, systems of public education, 
and political participation (ibid., 52). In summary: The classic Theory of 
Demographic Transition perceives the pre-transition stage of mankind as a 
more or less homogeneous period of high fertility. 
In the years following World War II, transition theory had an enormous in-
fluence on global development policies, as it made reducing fertility integral to 
the “modernization process” (Conelly 2008, 112). The central idea was to 
foster the economic and social development of so-called Third World coun-
tries, the long-term consequence of which would be, more or less automati-
cally, a reduction of fertility. Demographic research in these countries – above 
all in East Asia and particularly in Japan – nevertheless showed a reduction of 
fertility even when this was not preceded by improvements of living standards. 
Due to these results, Notestein and his colleagues undertook a first fundamental 
modification of the theory in 1950. Whereas he previously “treated fertility rate 
as a dependent variable, reflecting a culture’s social and economic develop-
ment, now he suggested that reducing fertility might be a necessary condition 
for such development.” (Conelly 2008, 138). This new variant became a basic 
precept of global population policy over subsequent decades. In demographic 
research, it engendered new interest in agrarian societies (past and present) 
with low fertility, and led to increasing weight being attributed to cultural fac-
tors for the explanation of fertility.3 Surprisingly, the basic theoretical link 
between low fertility and modernization was not called into question but rather 
only stripped of its causality. Low fertility was either a result (the original 
version) or a precondition (the modification) of modernization. Despite the 
inherent arbitrariness, the theory retained the “force of generalization” (Kirk 
1996, 365). 
The second influential dichotomic theory is the theory of “natural fertility” 
developed in the 1950s by French demographer Louis Henry. His approach as 
                                                             
3  Ever since, the significance of cultural factors is pointed out in all demographic examina-
tions of the transition theory (see, for example, the results of Coale and Watkins 1986). 
However, those going about this define culture as one or more variables on the macro level 
and not as part of the agency of concrete individuals or families as is the case in the cultural 
demography approach. On this subject, see below. 
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well was to describe the development from pre-industrial Europe to the 20th 
century using the terms “natural” and “controlled fertility” (Henry 1961). He 
defined “natural fertility” as a type of behavior in which a married couple did 
not intentionally endeavor to limit its number of offspring. He defined “con-
trolled fertility”, on the other hand, as the avoidance of additional births once a 
particular desired number of children had been reached (Coale 1986, 9). Never-
theless, in the field of historical demographics, the term “natural fertility” is 
often utilized in a more general sense to designate high and solely biologically 
limited marital fertility that is regarded as characteristic of pre-industrial and 
early industrialized societies. Only “the variance in age at first marriage” is 
said to have “led to different number of births per marriage” (according to the 
critical remarks in Schlumbohm 1992, 333). Beginning in the 1970s, this 
biologistic understanding of “natural fertility” was subjected to increasing 
criticism, which caused many demographers to eschew the term altogether. On 
the other hand, the very wide spectrum of marital fertility both with and with-
out the use of intentional birth control was precisely what encouraged other – 
primarily British and American – demographers to retain the term “natural 
fertility” used in contradistinction to intentional birth control. According to this 
view, “natural fertility” is defined to include very much behavior-dependent 
but not intentional variations of fertility (Knodel 1986, 359).  
Both the Theory of the Demographic Transition as well as the concept of 
natural fertility had positive effects on historical-demographic research, above 
all about Europe. They motivated scholars to conduct numerous empirical 
studies, mostly of a quantitative-statistical nature. The Theory of the Demo-
graphic Transition was closely connected with the Princeton project on Euro-
pean fertility decline (Coale and Waktins 1986). Thanks to this project, we 
have very detailed insights into the quantitative development of fertility 
throughout Europe (from the Atlantic to the Urals) from the mid-19th century 
to about 1960. Moreover, many of the participating demographers also investi-
gated periods even further back in the past and taken a look at the 18th century 
at least (on the subject of Germany, see, above all, Knodel 1988). The theory of 
natural fertility has also supplied the motivation for a large number of – like-
wise quantitative – studies of demographic structures and developments from 
the 16th to the 19th century. The research group headed by Louis Henry called 
attention to the importance of church books for the field of historical demogra-
phy, and developed methods of linking baptism, marriage and death records. 
But it has been precisely their great success in inciting empirical research 
that ultimate led to both theories being increasingly called into question. Since 
the 1980s, both theories have been at the center of critical discussions. This 
criticism has to do with two areas. Firstly, a growing body of empirical evi-
dence has been increasingly difficult to reconcile with these theories (Szreter 
1993; Ehmer 2004, 118-127). Secondly, the theoretical framework and a quan-
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titative-statistical empirical approach have proven to be unsuitable for the in-
vestigation of new issues related to people’s modes of behavior and attitudes. 
As to the first area: Of the many points of criticism, the most important has 
to do with the “intellectual construct of two stable states” before and after the 
“transition” (Gehrmann 2000, 164). With respect to the early modern period, 
the latest research findings have raised doubts about the purported balance 
between fertility and mortality, and generally about the assumption of a stable 
demographic structure. The population history of England – the European case 
on which the most comprehensive research has been done – exhibits violent 
fluctuations in fertility, mortality and population growth from the 16th to the 
18th century. They lead to the conclusion  
that we must proceed under the assumption of shifting demographic condi-
tions for the time prior to 1780 as well, which contradict the conventional con-
ception of a more or less constant, ‘naturally developing’ as it were, initial 
demographic level prevailing in pre-industrial times (Gehrmann and Sokoll 
2000, 187). 
This implies criticism of “homeostatic” or “auto-regulative” pre-industrial 
population models, which have a long tradition, particularly in German popula-
tion history (Fertig 2000; Schlumbohm 1996; Gehrmann 2000, 168f.). Appar-
ently, a sustainable balance between mortality and fertility has not emerged in 
the post-transitional phase either; what occurred instead was a temporary rise in 
fertility during the so-called baby boom after World War II, followed by a 
renewed decline to a lower level in the “Second Demographic Transition.”4 The 
Theory of Natural Fertility – even when applied in an explicitly non-biologistic 
way – has been criticized as well. Besides the wide variation of fertility pat-
terns, there is simply too much evidence of intentional birth control in pre-
modern societies.5 
2.2 New Cultural Historical Approaches 
As an alternative to the traditional great narratives, new methodological ap-
proaches to explaining historical fertility trends and variations have been dis-
cussed in the field of international historical demography even since the 1980s. 
These approaches have been designated as “cultural demography” or “anthro-
pological demography”. In the field of history, the so-called “cultural turn” in 
the 1970s a led to a stronger influence of cultural history and historical anthro-
pology as opposed to – or in combination with – social history and social sci-
ence history. 
                                                             
4  See the papers on this subject in the third section of this special volume. Research on the 
postwar baby boom, one of the few examples of a completely unexpected and massive in-
crease in birthrates during the 20th century, is, however, insufficient to date. 
5  For a critique, see the following paragraphs of this chapter, and the paper by Bertaux in this 
special issue. 
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These new approaches proceed from the assumption that fertility and its 
changes over time are the outcome of decisions made by individuals – single 
women and men as well as couples – and that these decisions are, in turn, based 
upon their respective cultural orientation and the degree of social latitude of 
their actions. These approaches constitute, in my view, a very promising com-
plement or supplement to quantitative-statistical demography. They attempt to 
place the wish to have children and fertility behavior into a broad social and 
cultural context that includes such factors as concepts of masculinity and femi-
ninity, marital power structures, concepts of the life course, intergenerational 
relations and the like. They also make an intentional effort to put an end to 
fertility research’s fixation on women and to address the influence of men and 
inter-gender relations on fertility behavior. Since these approaches have explic-
itly called into question the Theory of Demographic Transition, they emphasize 
the diversity of fertility regimes and especially of so-called “cultures of contra-
ception” (Gillis, Tilly, and Levine 1992) in social, regional and cultural re-
spects in pre-industrial as well as modern societies. The use of highly aggre-
gated demographic indices is indispensable for the analysis of trends; on the 
other hand, it risks obscuring the diversity of fertility patterns. 
In order to illustrate this development, I would like to set up an ideal-typical 
juxtaposition of two approaches to the European fertility decline based on two 
seminal and supremely influential books. The first one is Coale and Watkins 
(1986), which summarizes the results of the Princeton project that is a classic 
example of population studies and social science history. The second is Gillis, 
Tilly, and Levine (1992), which has been something like a flagship of new 
cultural approaches. What are the differences? I see them on six levels: (1) in 
the research interests; (2) in the understanding of historical change; (3) in the 
conceptualization of demographic behavior; (4) in the preference for particular 
historical sources and data; (5) in the range of analysis; (6) and finally in the 
methods and means of analysis. On each of these levels, the approaches are 
quite different. I would like to present these differences rather roughly in a 
wood-cut like style, but my intention is, of course, to take both of them seri-
ously and not to caricature them (see below). 
 
Research interests in classical population studies: 
- understanding the process of the European (later on called first) fertility decline 1860-
1960 as a whole; 
- building general explanatory models; 
- contributing to global political/economic progress. 
Research interests in cultural history: 
- understanding the complexity of human agency; 
- understanding individual and group meanings of demographic attitudes and practices; 
- understanding the meaning and evaluation of children and particularly of ones own 
offspring; 
- integrating sexual attitudes and practices into the explanatory framework. 
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Understanding of historical change in classical population studies: 
- phase/step concept of historical development; 
- 3-step- model (traditional society-transition/revolution-modern society, as in the theory of 
the demographic transition).  
Understanding of historical change in cultural history: 
- critical versus teleological models; 
- questioning transition theory; 
- assumption of co-existence of diverse demographic patterns or “cultures of contracep-
tion” in all historical societies; 
- shifting of the weight of patterns within societies. 
Conceptualization of demographic behaviour in classical population studies: 
- demographic behaviour as an element of demographic, socio-economic and cultural 
structures (such as mortality patterns, labour force participation, education, etc.). 
Conceptualization of demographic behaviour in cultural history: 
- demographic behavior as part of individual and family strategies, kinship networks, 
gender roles/identities; 
- images of maternity and paternity; 
- marital power relations, networks of communication, life course expectations. 
Historical sources/data in classical population studies: 
- quantitative sources; 
- census data or census like listings on the national or provincial level; 
- sources which provide access to the effects of demographic practices of masses of people 
or of entire populations. 
Historical sources/data in cultural history: 
- qualitative sources; 
- letters, diaries, reports; 
- oral history interviews; 
- anthropological field research; 
- sources which provide access to the attitudes of individuals or small social groups. 
Means of analysis in classical population studies: 
- statistical; 
- strict research design, testing hypotheses, precise definition demographic indices and 
variables; 
- contextualisation of findings in limited/controlled universe of pre-defined variables. 
Means of analysis in cultural history: 
- hermeneutic; 
- free and explorative research design; 
- contextualisation of findings in an open universe. 
Spatial and temporal range of analysis in classical population studies: 
- pan-European and/or international; 
- comparisons across times and cultures; 
- particular emphasis on modern societies. 
Spatial and temporal range of analysis in cultural history: 
- case studies; 
- local, regional, social groups; 
- individual families 
- open to all historical periods. 
 
So much for a brief look at these two paradigms. In the history of fertility, there 
was certainly no replacement of the social scientific paradigm by the cultural 
historical paradigm. Rather, there developed various forms of conflict, compe-
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tition, and also peaceful coexistence, but not that much real cooperation in 
empirical research, so far. It will be one of the major tasks of future research to 
develop productive forms of cooperation.6 In respect on the early modern pe-
riod, as stated above, there seems to already be greater integration of quantita-
tive demography, cultural history and historical anthropology. One of the rea-
sons for this is presumably that early modern quantifying studies as well 
display a micro-historical dimension in that they are based on church books 
that record the births, marriages and deaths of individual people. The tension 
between particular case and generalization, between individual and group, is 
likewise present in these quantitative historical sources just as it is in most so-
called qualitative sources. 
3. The Myth of High Fertility in Pre-Industrial Societies 
Classic theories of demographic development perceived the pre-transition stage 
of mankind – which covers almost the whole of world history to date – as a 
more or less homogeneous period of high fertility. The following section of this 
chapter argues that the assumption of high fertility before the Industrial Revo-
lution of the 19th Century is questionable for various reasons. In Western, 
Northern and Central Europe, the regions for which the best data is available to 
us, fertility was rather low in pre-modern times. The number of surviving chil-
dren per family was even considerably lower. My point in this digression into 
pre-modern times is to relativize the low fertility of the 20th century. In the 
past, living with few or no children was nothing out of the ordinary. This ar-
gument makes use mainly of quantitative evidence of historical-demographic 
studies on early modern Europe. I am relying on the results of many studies 
generated since the 1950s, and using the methods of family reconstitution – 
that is, linking up birth, marriage and burial registers in single parishes, which 
make it possible to construct vital histories of individuals and of their demo-
graphic behavior, and to aggregate individual and family data on the parish 
level (Flinn 1981, 1-12). 
These studies show that the number of offspring per woman or couple is an 
extraordinarily variable magnitude that is influenced by a whole series of fac-
tors. First of all, we must keep in mind that although puberty and menopause 
constitute biological caesuras in the life course, they display very high variabil-
ity throughout history and among different societies. The onset of puberty was 
relatively late in pre-industrial European societies; later in the lower classes 
than in the upper classes, later in Eastern Europe than in the West. This indi-
cates that puberty is influenced by the state of economic development and 
especially by the standard of living. A girl from an urban laborer or rural peas-
                                                             
6  On this issue, also see the paper by Simon Szreter in this special issue. 
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ant family in the 16th or 17th century reached sexual maturity at approximately 
age 16-18, whereas the onset of puberty is at about age 12 in Western Europe 
today (Laslett 1971). As for menopause, the same process took place in the 
opposite direction, moving increasingly beyond age 40 over the course of his-
tory. Nevertheless, historical demography has demonstrated that the biological 
phase of fertility is of limited significance in European history. Social factors 
play the decisive role. 
Firstly, there are rules and norms that link the right to engage in sexuality 
and reproduction with a particular social status, marital status and age. In 
Christian Europe during the medieval and early modern periods, marriage was 
deemed to be the sole legitimate setting for procreation. At the same time, 
matrimony was subject to certain conditions. In the early modern period in 
Western, Northern and Central Europe, there emerged a marital pattern that 
bound marriage to economic independence and the capability of establishing 
ones own household separate from that of ones parents. The consequence of 
this was a high age at first marriage – among brides, the average age was 25-
27; the average groom was even a couple of years older. A considerable pro-
portion of men and women – at times up to 20% – remained single and child-
less their whole lives. European Marriage Pattern was the designation given to 
this in historical demography. A contrasting pattern was to be found in many 
regions of Eastern and Southern Europe, where women married at a much 
younger age, usually under 20 (Flinn 1981, 27f.; Bardet/Dupâquier 1998, 490). 
Naturally, in pre-modern Europe, young people and young adults strove to 
engage in sexual relations. But, in doing so, they sought to avoid pregnancies, 
or, if a woman got pregnant nevertheless, they married before the baby’s birth. 
In fact, in most regions of pre-industrial Europe, the rate of out-of-wedlock 
births was extraordinarily low. 
Secondly, marital fertility also varied greatly. Even when the spouses con-
tinually cohabited and regularly had sexual relations, the intervals between 
births differed. While a mother breastfed her baby, she thereby considerably 
delayed conceiving again. Above all, however, many married couples did not 
constantly live together. The high degree of mobility in pre-modern Europe – 
first and foremost due to labor migration – resulted in many spouses being 
temporarily separated for longer or shorter periods. To this can be added the 
high level of mortality, which dissolved marriages due to the death of husbands 
or wifes. Even if remarriage was frequent (above all on the part of men), death 
meant the interruption of marital life. Finally, consideration must be given to 
the irregular and dramatically fluctuating food supply and the frequent epidem-
ics. Crop failures led to famines, and people who are hungry, malnourished or 
sick have a diminished capacity or readiness to bear children (Flinn 1981, 24-
46). 
All of these factors led to high variability in marital fertility. In Germany, 
one extremely striking characteristic is the high regional variability. Marital 
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fertility in East Frisian villages was barely two-thirds the rate prevailing in 
Swabian and Bavarian communities. Indeed, there were also astounding differ-
ences in fertility within a single region or among neighboring villages (Knodel 
1988, 372). The explanation of regional variability is not altogether clear. Ex-
tremes of very high or low fertility are usually explained with reference to the 
practice of breastfeeding, which delayed the onset of a woman’s ability to 
conceive again after the previous birth, and can thereby considerably increase 
the interval between births (ibid., 251). Presumably, infants in Northern Ger-
many were more often breastfed or nourished this way for a longer period than 
in the South. The parallel differences in infant mortality point to this intercon-
nection, although scholarly knowledge about regional breastfeeding practices is 
still very sketchy. The task of explaining differences in fertility becomes even 
more difficult when we consider that they manifest themselves not only in 
polarized extremes but across an entire spectrum with fluid transitions. 
Social differences in fertility are more difficult to register and summarize. 
The prevailing opinion tends toward the view that in the early modern period 
and even into the 19th century, social variability of fertility in Germany was 
low (Knodel 1988, 296). In other words, the major differences were among 
villages and regions, whereas within a particular village – even if it displayed 
considerable socioeconomic inequality – astoundingly uniform fertility behav-
ior prevailed (Knodel 1986, 387). Nevertheless, studies of several villages 
suggest that marital fertility in the families that made up the peasant upper class 
was higher than in those of the lower social strata in rural areas. Indeed, this 
was most probably primarily the result of socially divergent marital age. Since 
men in the village’s upper class generally married younger brides than did men 
who were members of the rural underclass, their wives gave birth to more 
children over the course of a marriage. In areas where higher marital fertility 
overlapped with a low age at first marriage, one, two or even three more chil-
dren were born to upper-class families than to those of the underclass). Though 
caution is certainly still mandated here, one can nevertheless proceed from the 
general assumption that rural society in Germany displayed socially differenti-
ated fertility and a “positive correlation between the number of offspring and 
wealth” (Gehrmann 2000, 237). 
Is it possible, despite this great variability, to nevertheless generalize about 
the level of fertility in pre-modern Europe? In my opinion, several generaliza-
tions are possible. If the mean age at first marriage was around 25 and the mean 
age at birth of the last child was around 40, the reproductive span available to 
women was about 15 years. Since many marriages were terminated by death of 
the husband or wife before the end of the reproductive period, however, in 
practice the span was even lower. In 18th-century Lyon, for instance, the mean 
was about 12 years; in a couple of parishes in 18th-century Sweden, it was 15 
years for peasant wives but only 12 years for the wives of landless agricultural 
laborers. Similar differences between the upper and lower classes of early 
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modern European societies can be found in many other regions as well. In 
addition, the birth intervals were surprisingly high, and they lengthened with 
increasing parity: something like 2 or 2½ years between the first and the second 
birth, up to 3½ years or even more for higher parities.7 Therefore, for an aver-
age married woman, it was not possible to have more than 5 or 6 births, and 
where the age at first marriage rose to 28 or 29, at least one potential birth 
would be lost. Aggregated data for England in the period 1750-1779 give a 
Completed Fertility Rate (CFR) for married women of 5.0 (Hinde 2003, 225-
226). In addition, one has to keep in mind that not all women married. Figures 
between 10 and 20 percent of never-marrying women were common in many 
early modern European regions, particularly in Central Europe. Again, there is 
some evidence that women of the landless rural population married later and 
less frequently than women of the peasant class. 
A very important though often neglected point is the limited significance of 
fertility for reproduction in pre-modern societies. Of at least equal importance 
was the high infant and child mortality (Vögele 2007, 2010). Here as well, the 
regional and social differences were very great (as indicated above using the 
example of breastfeeding). If one were to nevertheless dare to make a bold 
generalization, then on average one might say that broadly one quarter of in-
fants failed to survive the first year of life, and another quarter the next 9 to 14 
years. The average marriage, therefore, would at best produce 2½ to 3 children 
that survived to adulthood. In pre-modern societies, the birthrate is a measure 
of fertility but certainly not of reproduction. About 30 years ago, Tony Wrigley 
estimated that 20 percent of all couples in pre-industrial Europe would have no 
surviving heirs, and another 20 percent only one (Wrigley 1978). 
Such generalizations of the quantitative dimension of pre-modern European 
fertility are very rough, of course. Historical reality, in contrast, was dominated 
by differences, fluctuations and variations. Regional, local and social fertility 
levels were influenced by demographic conditions such as age at marriage and 
proportions never marrying, by illegitimacy, premarital conception and the like, 
and they were also influenced by external factors such as wars, famines, epi-
demics, various forms of occupation or labor migration and, last but not least, 
by whether or not breastfeeding was practiced. Nevertheless, if we take infant 
and child mortality into consideration, then we get a much different picture of 
pre-modern human reproduction than if we had restricted our focus to birth 
rates. Two to three surviving children per married couple, and a significant 
portion of the population who remained lifelong childless singles is a set of 
facts and circumstances that does not differ so very much from that which 
prevailed after the first fertility decline. 
                                                             
7  Rising intervals for higher parities is also part of the ‘natural fertility’ model. 
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4. Deliberate Control of Reproduction 
There are many quantitative and qualitative studies on the subject of early 
modern birth control in Europe. To an increasing extent, the two approaches 
are also comingled in the same study (Jütte 2003, 94-101). Initial evidence 
pointing to restriction of births was provided by quantitative studies, the results 
of which deviated from the expected model of “natural fertility” and this devia-
tion was interpreted as an indicator of birth control being practiced. Most 
works on this subject deal with marital fertility control. Quantitative indicators 
of this are, first of all, long and parity-related (i.e. increasing with the number 
of children) intervals between births (cf. Gehrmann 2007, 99f.). Examples are 
to be found is such disparate social milieus as 18th-century Hungarian villages 
(Santow 1995, 28) and the City of Zürich from the 16th to the early 19th centu-
ries (Pfister 1985). The frequently observed lengthening of the interval between 
births from the 16th to the 19th centuries is, accordingly, interpreted as due to 
proliferation of the practice of birth control. 
An additional indicator is the age of women at last birth. In Zürich between 
1580 and 1819, for example, this figure decreased from age 41.4 to 34.7 (Pfis-
ter 1985, 93). This is regarded as evidence of “stopping” – i.e. avoiding addi-
tional pregnancies after the birth of a specific number of children. Quantitative 
procedures enable scholars to show that members of certain social groups pur-
sued the aim of limiting their number of offspring – for instance, the German 
aristocracy at least from the 18th century on (Schröter 2007). To sum up: It has 
been demonstrated by quantitative research that birth control was practiced by 
married couples in various social groups – for instance in France and England 
by the aristocracy and by segments of the urban bourgeoisie as well. But there 
were also rural regions and peasant societies that display clear evidence of a 
“one-child system,” such as the above-mentioned villages in Southern Hungary 
in the 18th century. 
Despite this concentration of research on the limitation of marital fertility, 
we cannot rule out that late marriage or dispensing with matrimony altogether 
was also motivated by the desire to have fewer children or none at all. After all, 
it is well known that abstaining from marriage as a means of birth control 
played a key role in the population theory of Malthus, for whom it constituted a 
“preventive check” to limit human fertility in contradistinction to the “positive 
check” of mortality catastrophes. In his 1798 “Essay on the Principle of Popu-
lation,” Malthus put forth numerous arguments as to why it would be advanta-
geous for members of various social classes to forego marriage and offspring. 
For example: “The labourer who earns eighteen pence a day, and lives with 
some degree of comfort as a single man, will hesitate a little before he divides 
that pittance among four or five, which seems to be just sufficient for one” 
(Szreter and Garret 2000, 51). From this, Simon Szreter and Eidildh Garrett 
conclude that  
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both to Malthus and to the popular culture, reproduction and the burden of too 
many children were matters of conscious consideration in late-eighteenth-
century English society; fertility was well within the sphere of conscious cal-
culation… (ibid.). 
In their well-known seminal study of “The Population History of England: 
1541-1871”, Wrigley and Schofield (1981) established a connection between 
workers’ salaries and age at first marriage: when pay increases, people married 
earlier; when it decreases, they married later. In this period, England was al-
ready a developed market economy in which people could have adjusted their 
marital behavior – and thus their number of offspring – to business cycle de-
velopments. But the limitation of marital fertility could have also followed this 
pattern. Data on Germany from about 1760 to 1850 suggest postponement of 
births during economic crises. Just such a pattern of behavior can be imputed 
above all to those married couples who had not (yet) lost any children 
(Gehrmann 2007, 96-99). 
Such statistical results take on added weight as they are also supported to an 
increasing extent by the conclusions of cultural-historical research. There is a 
considerable body of writing on the limitation of family size and of the number 
of children from the 16th to the 19h centuries. Angus McLaren (1984) was one 
of the first historians to examine fertility in the pre-modern era from a compre-
hensive cultural-historical perspective. The discourses on birth control were 
diverse and conflicting. They included many voices attacking and condemning 
such practices (which, of course, can also be taken as testimony to how wide-
spread they were). Christian sexual morals in particular held carnal relations 
not intended for procreation to be a sin. However, the discourses also included 
defenses of contraception. From this great abundance of contemporary state-
ments, McLaren (1984, 62-64) derived four motivations for practicing birth 
control. One chief argument was that people engaged in sexual intercourse 
primarily for pleasure and not procreation. A second argument in favor of birth 
control was that it would spare the wife an endless series of pregnancies. A 
third argument was of a financial nature: the problem of providing a dowry for 
numerous daughters or, in society’s lower strata, to even provide sufficient 
food and clothing for a large number of children. A fourth argument empha-
sized the numerous problems that children could cause: illnesses, accidents and 
the like, and the not inconsiderable risk of thanklessness and rebellion against 
their own parents. 
Sparing women from having to undergo serial pregnancy seems to have 
been a prime consideration widespread far beyond pre-modern England in the 
discourses on birth control and the corresponding practices. There is evidence 
for the existence of taboos prohibiting sexual intercourse with a nursing mother 
– even if she breastfed her baby for several years – in numerous historical and 
contemporary cultures. They are said to be predicated on protecting both 
mother and infant (Santow 1995, 24-26). It was, first and foremost, women 
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themselves who could reduce the risk of getting pregnant again by extending 
the period in which they breastfed their baby. A contemporary account about 
the wife of a German pastor in the mid-18th century reported that because she 
dreaded frequent puerperium like the devil (though she had already spent con-
siderable time in postpartum repose), it was her practice to breastfeed her 
children uncommonly long. Schack (her son, J.E.) was two years old and al-
most all of his 32 teeth had already come in, but he was still drinking mother’s 
milk (Schlumbohm 1983, 24). 
All these examples give abundant evidence of the use of deliberate birth control 
in the early modern period. Indeed, preventing pregnancy was even more im-
portant for single women than for married ones. The above-mentioned low 
rates of illegitimacy in most parts of Europe in the early modern period have 
been interpreted as evidence that contraceptive practices were being used. 
Adolescents and young adults – who, perhaps, did not marry until they were 30 
or even older – did engage in premarital sex, and they knew about and used 
techniques to prevent pregnancy. However, low rates of illegitimacy were also 
the upshot of a form of “matchmaking” whereby a premarital pregnancy led to 
nuptials just prior to delivery. On the basis of his examination of English data 
from the 16th to the 18th centuries, Peter Laslett estimated that 20-60% of all 
conceptions were extramarital (Laslett 1980, 54-55). Pregnancies and births out 
of wedlock were viewed negatively in the early modern period and subjected to 
social sanctions. Single mothers were punished in various ways. Historical 
scholars have beheld the persecution of these women in numerous qualitative 
sources – primarily transcripts of legal proceedings held since the 16th century 
in which officials interrogated unmarried pregnant women or single mothers, 
actual or purported fathers, and witnesses. These sources reveal that people of 
all social classes were relatively well informed about the facts of life and about 
contraception – even if this enlightenment was also frequently mixed together 
with myths. This included comprehension of the workings of the menstrual 
cycle, coitus interruptus (withdrawal), etc.8 It can be assumed that these in-
sights gained in premarital carnal knowledge also had an impact later on mari-
tal sexual relations. Presumably, once they wedded, most couples dispensed 
with using such methods, but these were available if needed. 
I am unable to go into great detail here about the birth control methods that 
were known and used in the early modern period. Suffice it to say that there 
were three main sets of practices: Firstly, knowledge of contraceptive methods 
was available, and there is a lot of empirical evidence that these methods were 
indeed utilized; secondly, if they failed, abortion was widely practiced; thirdly, 
turning children over to such institutions as foundling hospitals or practicing 
infanticide were means used to eliminate offspring or to keep their number low. 
                                                             
8  For a wide range of examples from a remote rural Alpine region in 18th-century Austria, 
see Becker (1990). 
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Widespread methods of birth control included abstinence and coitus inter-
ruptus, but there were other means of contraception as well (Jütte 2003; Santow 
1995). The condom came into use from the 16th century onwards (though they 
did not become widespread until the 19th century), first as a prophylactic de-
vice to prevent syphilis but increasingly as a means of contraception. Condoms 
were made of linen, sheep gut or the small intestines of other animals, leather 
and other materials. Other contraceptive devices included contraceptive 
sponges soaked in lemon juice, slices of lemon, beeswax or certain resins that a 
woman inserted into her vagina. However, since empirical evidence of such 
practices stems from local or regional studies, it is impossible to say how wide-
spread knowledge of them actually was, and whether they belonged to specific 
“communication communities” and not to others. Certainly, none of these 
methods was 100% infallible. But even in the present day, the Pearl Index that 
measures the effectiveness of various means of contraception indicates great 
discrepancies between theoretical and practical effectiveness that result from, 
for instance, incorrect application. Even if most methods of birth control in the 
early modern period were not absolutely reliable, couples could at least succeed 
in lengthening birth intervals. 
Several contraceptive substances made from plants were used to perform 
abortions, which were prohibited in early modern Europe (Leibrock-Plehn 
1993). Nevertheless, there is a large body of medical literature discussing the 
abortifacient properties of certain plants, herbs, etc. In the 16th century, more 
and more such books were published in various European vernaculars and in 
ever-larger print runs. This could well have been connected to the legal prose-
cution of abortion, since these substances were officially classified as medi-
cines permissible for the treatment of pathological amenorrhea or fetal death. 
Of the more than 100 such herbal remedies prescribed in 16th-century German 
medical sources, approximately a quarter have been confirmed as effective by 
modern science (Leibrock-Plehn 1993, 81). They were for sale in pharmacies; 
other dealers included quack healers, herbalists and midwives. Moreover, 
knowledge about abortion-inducing substances was passed on from older 
women to girls and disseminated in social networks. In addition to such plants, 
there were also certain physical movements or stresses that were said to induce 
discharge of the embryo, as well as magical means (such as the wearing of a 
snakeskin). In spite of these practices being outlawed, they were rarely exposed 
(Stukenbrock 1993). Often, men were the driving force behind an abortion in 
that they talked the woman they had gotten pregnant into aborting, obtained the 
abortion-inducing substance, or established contact with an abortionist. 
In judicial proceedings, infanticide played a considerably more significant 
role since a pregnancy followed by the infant’s disappearance was harder to 
conceal. Most of the defendants were single mothers who, either through ne-
glect or some intentional act, allegedly killed their newborn babies. Married 
women, on the other hand, could avail themselves of the possibility of giving 
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birth to their unwanted child in normal fashion and then doing away with it 
over the following weeks through intentional endangerment or malnourish-
ment. Such practices rarely came to trial since, in light of the high rate of infant 
mortality prevailing in any case, it was difficult to draw the line between an 
unintentional fatality and murder with knowledge aforethought, and premedita-
tion could rarely be proved. Despite all the evidence, there is widespread 
agreement in the literature that infanticide was not a mass phenomenon in the 
early modern period in Europe; rather, it tended to be associated with particular 
social stresses and mental burdens placed on single mothers (Ulbricht 1990). In 
addition to legal prosecution, infanticide was religiously and socially stigma-
tized – although perpetrators and accessories used as an exculpatory pleading 
the religious argument that this was a means of conveying innocent children 
directly to Heaven (Schulte 1989; Ulbrich 1990, 92-207). 
However, there was also a legitimate form of de-facto killing of children: 
the foundling hospitals that, beginning in the 15th century, were established in 
certain European cities such as Florence. A large number of such institutions 
were set up in the late 18th century, above all in large metropolises but increas-
ingly in middle-size cities too. They made it possible for single mothers or 
married parents to give away their unwanted newborns, usually anonymously. 
The official purpose of foundling hospitals was to prevent infanticide. De facto, 
however, the rate of mortality among those placed in their care was extremely 
high – 80-90% of the infants admitted subsequently died – so that even 18th-
century contemporaries referred to such facilities as “murder pits” (Ulbricht 
1984, 214). The foundling hospital of a major city served, above all, single 
mothers in the surrounding region. For example, 41% of all children born in 
Vienna in 1856 ended up in a foundling hospital, where approximately 80% of 
them died. 
One essential characteristic of birth control in early modern Europe was that 
it was practiced in the upper as well as the lower strata of the social hierarchy, 
though, indeed, for different reasons and with varying results. Let’s look first at 
Europe’s most privileged elites. Since the economically or politically dominant 
social groups were small and genealogically well documented, we have avail-
able to us a series of studies on both local and national levels about their bio-
logical reproduction and demographic development. S. Ryan Johansson (1987) 
summarized the most important of these studies from the period from about 
1500-1900.9 His major result is that there was a reproduction level below the 
replacement level both of families and whole local or national elite classes, 
which led to their more or less continuous contraction throughout the early 
modern period. If the elites remained numerically stable or even grew in num-
                                                             
9  Among the elite families or populations that he investigated were the British peerage, the 
Florentine and Venetian patriciate, the bourgeoisie of Geneva and Holland, and the ruling 
families of various European states. For the original sources, see Johansson (1987). 
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bers, than only by admitting new members to their ranks and integrating those 
who had climbed the social ladder. According to Johansson, the main motiva-
tion for low fertility in these social groups was status anxiety and the avoidance 
of downward mobility. This involved “a strong commitment among married 
couples to the preservation of the material basis of their own high social status 
and to the transmission of that status to their children” (Johansson 1987, 463). 
Their major means were, firstly, reducing marital fertility, and, secondly, re-
stricting marriage of their surviving children to only one or two of them, while 
the others remained bachelors or spinsters, accepted church positions or entered 
monasteries. In Christian and particularly in Catholic Europe, lifelong celibacy 
was culturally esteemed. 
On the other end of the social spectrum we find unmarried young women, 
most of them agricultural laborers or domestic servants, who were involved in 
short-lived or long-term pre-marital sexual relationships. If it was improbable 
or impossible that this sexual relationship would lead to marriage or if it was 
not even desirable, then they sought to avoid pregnancy or to terminate it via 
abortion. In the worst case, a newborn infant could be killed, set out to die of 
exposure, or turned over to a foundling hospital, which was virtually tanta-
mount to a death sentence. The motives for doing so were the consequences of 
an extramarital pregnancy or birth for both the mothers and their children. 
Single mothers risked censure or fine by the legal authorities, and were fre-
quently subjected to ridicule and discrimination by the local community. For 
female servants, getting pregnant or having a child out of wedlock meant loss 
of employment (and also, as a rule, loss of lodgings). Frequently, they were 
forced to leave the local area where they lived and worked, which also meant 
being torn out of their social network. Illegitimate children were subjected to 
social discrimination and had far fewer opportunities to make good in life than 
did children born to a married couple. They were much more at risk of infant 
and child mortality. In many European regions, they were prohibited from 
taking up crafts and trades (if these were organized in guilds), and were ineligi-
ble for citizenship of a city. Between these two poles was a broad spectrum of 
social positions in which forgoing children or restricting their number could 
have appeared advantageous and desirable. 
In this paper I have been concentrating on early modern Europe. In this final 
section, however, I would also like to take a brief look at a non-European coun-
try, Japan. The population history of pre-industrial Japan long ago attracted the 
interest of historical demographers (both foreign and domestic), which led to 
intensive scholarly activity. Despite a few gaps in the research (Saito 1992), 
wide agreement nevertheless prevails as to the fundamentals of Japanese popu-
lation history and to long term fertility trends. In the 17th century, the Japanese 
people was probably the “densest settled population in the world” (Macfarlane 
1997, 34) and Edo (later named Tokyo), with approximately a million inhabi-
tants in this period, is considered to have been the “largest city on earth” (ibid., 
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22). In the 18th century, the early modern population growth seems to have 
ceased, and the population stagnated until the mid-19th century. In this period, 
Japan’s defining characteristics were high urbanization, small families, and 
widespread birth control (Hanley and Yamamura 1977, 314). Despite display-
ing an age at marriage of women (around 20) that was low in comparison to 
Europe, the level of fertility was rather low, with a completed family size of 3 
to 4 children ever born. Means of birth control included early stopping of fertil-
ity with last childbirth at 33-35, due to an end of intercourse of married cou-
ples. There is evidence that having late babies was regarded as improper, the 
link between sex and marriage as a cultural norm was weak, and (male) extra-
marital sex was not seen as sinful (Macfarlane 19997, 306-315). Moreover, 
birth-intervals were longer than in Europe, comprising typically three years 
between each child, due to long and universal breastfeeding. A further argu-
ment concerns the high work load of Japanese women in agriculture. As a rule, 
women worked continuously up to birth (and immediately after birth, as well) 
which often led to fetal losses (Saito 1981). Interestingly, there is no evidence 
of coitus interruptus or of contraceptives. Abortion, however, is said to have 
been widely practiced at least since the late 17th century (Hanley and Yama-
mura 1977), and there is also evidence that “infanticide was unusually preva-
lent in early modern Japan” (Macfarlane 1997, 333-350, here 347; Saito 1992). 
“All scholars agree that the Japanese resorted to abortion and infanticide as 
means of limiting the number of children within marriage…” (Hanley 1991, 
698). The Japanese term for infanticide, mabiki, refers to thinning seedlings 
(Cornell 1996, 34). A widely-used practice was putting a sheet of paper over 
the mouth and nose of a newborn baby until it would stop breathing. As in 
other East Asian cultures, this practice was not regarded simply as an act of 
killing, but of sending back human beings waiting to be born to wait slightly 
longer until it is their turn once more. In religious cultures where Buddhism, 
Confucianism and Shinto were blurred, such practices are said not to have been 
stigmatized (Macfarlane 1997, 333-350). The Japanese example shows once 
more that deliberate control of fertility in preindustrial times appeared in vari-
ous cultures and in many variations, and that it was certainly not limited to 
Europe.10 
The general conclusion from all the quantitative and qualitative evidence of 
birth control before the so-called fertility decline is that having or not having a 
child was indeed a choice. When women (or men) decided to avoid pregnancy, 
birth, or rearing a child, they had good chances of finding options conducive to 
achieving their respective aim.  
                                                             
10  In spite of the wide agreement among scholars, there is still an ongoing discussion about 
deliberate control of fertility by individuals through infanticide in early modern Japan, par-
ticularly in relation to high infant mortality due to other causes; for discussion see Cornell 
(1996). 
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Here, I would like to very briefly go into one last aspect. If, instead of re-
ducing reproduction to biological reproduction, we consider it as social repro-
duction, we thereby bring up the question of whether parents’ biological chil-
dren grew up in the parents’ home and, if so, how long. In the family system 
that prevailed in early modern Western and Central Europe, a widespread prac-
tice was to send away even very young children to other families to work – 
usually as servants – or, conversely, to take in other people’s children. Compa-
rable practices are still in use today in a totally different context in the form of 
so-called fosterage in rural areas of West Africa (Alber 2004). Explanations of 
fertility that concentrate exclusively on biological parenthood fall short of 
presenting a complete picture of many cultures. 
5. Conclusion 
What is, then, the benefit of a long historical perspective? Certainly, attitudes 
towards children and the motives for practicing birth control changed consid-
erably during the transition to the Modern Age, and it is undoubtedly true that 
it is not until this Modern Age that we can properly speak of family planning. 
Nevertheless, living with very few children and reproduction on a low level 
that was hardly above the replacement rate were characteristic of many pre-
modern societies too. Low levels of reproduction seem to be the rule in history 
rather than the exception. What I want to bring up for discussion in conjunction 
with this brief look at the early modern period is whether low fertility follow-
ing the first and the second demographic transition is perhaps not as extraordi-
nary as it generally appears. We could make an effort to consider the fertility of 
the recent past and the present not as the endpoint of a developmental process 
but rather as one of numerous historical variants, and thereby asses them in a 
way that is somewhat calmer, cooler and more objective. 
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